The Russia-Ukraine conflict is the most serious test of European security in the 21st century and the forgone conclusion is that Russia can easily prevail in the conflict, but this has not been the case. This article uses a contingency theory approach to report findings on the riddle why Russia has not easily defeated Ukraine. I report findings based on a contingency theoretical perspective that indicates Russian victory is unlikely because of negative contingencies having direct impact on the Russian economy including a sharp reduction in the value of the Russian ruble, the potential for political loss of support of the middle class for President Putin, diplomatic and political isolation and danger of escalation of the war, affecting Russia to a greater degree than the Ukraine.
Introduction
President Putin allegedly stated: "If I wanted, Russian troops could not only be in Kiev in two days, but in Riga, Vilnius, Tallinn, Warsaw or Bucharest, too" [1] .
So, the big question is, why isn't he? The purpose of this article is to shed some light on this riddle by analyzing the contingency factors affecting Russia and Ukraine and discuss the consequences for the two countries. This article argues that contingency factors limit the options and freedom of action for the Russian government in a total war with Ukraine. Particularly, the Russian government needs to take into consideration the impact the Ukraine conflict has and will have on all aspects of life in the Russian Federation; these consequences are many. First is the direct impact on the economy as consequences of the sanctions imposed by, primarily, the United States and the European Union. The Russian ruble has taken a hit in the currency markets, capital flight is rampant argue that contingency factors and their consequences affect both countries but Russia more negatively. Hence the outcome of the conflict is a stalemate.
The paper is organized into five main parts: first, is the introduction; second, the qualitative design and methodology used are described; third, a short theoretical review of the literature streams used as a theoretical basis for the research domain and related proposition; fourth, evidence for the global contingencies of the war for Russia and Ukraine are presented; finally, conclusions are drawn.
Methodology
This paper uses an explanatory qualitative case study methodology [3] where the researcher departs from a theory widely used in international relations, business strategy and political science literature. The theory is used to guide the collection of secondary information, which is then analyzed by categorization and comparison among the relevant stakeholders as recommended in the research methodology literature [4] [5] [6] . As sources for evidence, I used open source articles, reports and websites. Additional insight was developed by observation during frequent visits to Ukraine. Cross referencing and multiple sources of evidence were used to validate claims where plausible. To control for plausible biases in the data collection, analysis and findings two peers to reviewed earlier drafts of this article and offer critical reviews. As a result, new sources of data were used, the analysis was improved and the discussion, implication and conclusion sections were improved. I owe them much for the constructive feedback.
Theory and Proposition
This paper uses the contingency theory approach, which is widely used in the international relations, business strategy, political power and behavioral sciences, to solve the riddle why Russia has not gained a quick victory in the war with Ukraine. Such contingency approach to researching plausible outcomes of conflicts and strategies has been advocated in the literature [7] [8] [9] . Proposition: contingencies and consequences of the war are negatively affecting Russia more than Ukraine. maidan protest begun in Kiev [19] . Similarly, Russian trade sanctions on Ukraine have hurt the Russian economy as much needed components for the Russian military industrial complex manufactured in Ukraine has dried up. The Ukrainian components facilitated Russia's export of contracted military equipment such as the AN140 tactical airplane and Mi-38 transport helicopter, the Ka-52 and Mi-28 attack helicopters. These helicopters are designed to use engines made by Ukraine's Motor Sich plant [20] . Also, Ukraine was one of Russia's biggest trade partners before the conflict. For example, Ukraine was the largest buyer of Russian gas as it purchased 60 billion cubic meters of gas in 2012 which dwarfs Germany's purchases of 38 billion cubic meters, the second largest customer for Russian gas. Also, Ukraine was a reliable and cheap supplier of agricultural products to Russia which imported meat, gains, milk, vegetables, fruit and processed food products from Ukraine. Hence the Russian sanctions on Ukraine hurt Russia greatly from an economic point of view and Russia's aspirations for further integration with the European Union appears to be out of the questions [21] .
Global Contingencies and the Consequences of the War for Russia and Ukraine
Another blow to the Russian economy was the collapse of price of oil from over $100 in 2013 to as low as $28 in 2015 and a low $50 s in 2017. This must be a great concern for Russia as one half of its export revenue is energy related. The state-run media has alleged that the collapse of the price of oil is engineered by the USA with aid from Saudi Arabia to punish Russia for its interference in Ukraine [22] There is significant evidence Russia's war with Ukraine, employing hybrid tactics, is having a significant negative impact on Ukraine. The Ukraine currency has collapsed in value; in the first two months of 2015, the Ukraine currency lost 40% of its value prompting international rating services to downgrade the country's sovereign debt to Ca, which means an imminent risk of default [26] [27] . Ukraine has de facto defaulted on its sovereign foreign debt, the GDP has declined by as much as a quarter, hyperinflation has doubled the price of basic food, while electricity, water and gas prices rose 553% in 2015 [28] . The Crimea is lost and the critical Donbass basin, one of the key industrial engines of the Ukrainian economy, is lost or devastated. Sixty-five coal mines have been lost resulting in severe coal shortages for the coal fired electricity plants, which produce 38% of Ukraine's electricity and most of the coal fired district heating plants in major cities. In the fall of 2015, only a two-week supply of coal was in stock and three months' supply of gas was in storage with little signs of further external supplies [29] [30] . How the Kiev government managed to keep the lights and heat on during the 2015/16 and 2016/7 winters is a mystery. The official story, circulated in the Ukrainian media, is that reverse flow of gas from the EU has made up the shortage but, the share volume of gas consumed by Ukraine, which is about twice the total German imports of natural gas from Russia, makes this explanation doubtful. A more likely explanation is that a secret deal has been made where the EU pays for or guarantees the payments for Open Journal of Social Sciences Ukrainian gas imports from Russia. The annexation of Crimea and loss of some of the Donbass industries had severe impact on Ukrainian banks because of non-performing loans from these regions. The borrowers from the Ukrainian banks didn't pay their debts but, they collected or transferred their bank balances in the Ukrainian banks. More than 20 Ukrainian banks went into liquidation or receivership in the first two years of the crisis [31] [32] and, by 2017 the Ukrainian government owned 55% of the banking system after the country's largest bank, Privat Bank, had to be saved by the government. Also, Russia was one of Ukraine's biggest export markets, which has been closed by Russian sanctions and the Ukrainian counter-sanctions. The combined economic shocks of hyperinflation, loss of the Donbass and Crimea, cost of the war in Donbass, export restrictions to Russia, banking crisis and the collapse in the value of the Ukraine hryvnia have devastated the Ukrainian economy.
On the diplomatic front, Russia has scored significant victories with the Minsk Moreover, the armed forces of Ukraine have gained moral and material support from abroad. An Ukrainian-Polish-Lithuanian brigade has been established and negotiations are underway to establish a Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria joint brigade [33] . NATO has given Ukraine a comprehensive package of aid in the security and defense sector [34] and, Ukraine has received material support and training from the USA and UK. Canada has chipped in and it is providing military training to the Ukraine army and, the two countries have signed a free trade agreement. Additionally, the Ukraine armed forces co-operation and competence was strengthened by co-hosting the 17 th Sea Breeze fleet exercises in the Black Sea in July 2017, in which 17 NATO nations participated. The co-hosting of the all arms exercises by the USA and Ukraine is a clear indication of the commitment NATO has made to the defense of Ukraine [35] . Even with intense efforts by Russia, Ukraine survived the annexation of Crimea and the military onslaught on the Donbass and fought the military situation to a stalemate and, after more than three years of conflict, Ukraine has not collapsed into the Russia's hands.
Conclusion
The evidence supports the proposition that Ukraine has more contingency factors in its favor than Russia. Hence the answer to the riddle why Russia has not waged a total war on Ukraine and conquered Kiev is that external and internal contingency factors, such as economic, diplomatic and geopolitical contingencies, have limited Russia's actions. Furthermore, the plausibility of Russia waging a total war on the Ukraine is unlikely to happened because, of the Ukraine military's defense capability and NATO and US support. Moreover, it appears that the tide of public and government opinion in Ukraine and western countries is so persuasively against Russia that the opportunity for Russia to influence events in Ukraine by non-violent means is going to be very limited for the foreseeable future. The world opinion is favorable towards Ukraine's struggle for its independence, the armed forces of Ukraine are fully mobilized, Ukraine has a government and military that has gained legitimacy via elections, the surrounding countries, such as Poland and the Baltic states have mobilized and generally NATO has built up its forces on Russia's borders. The EU, IMF and World Bank, as well as, many European governments have committed to Ukraine.
Consequently, the contingency factors negatively affecting Russia have grown since the conflict started and this has benefited Ukraine and, Russia's opportunity to take Kiev by military means is lost.
